Netflix’s decision to acquire the rights to new seasons of the Russian animated series Masha and the Bear sparked an international debate in late June. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna warned that this was not merely harmless children’s entertainment, but one of Russia’s soft power tools.
The message was quickly picked up by Western media. It was covered by, among others, The Guardian, ERR and several other outlets. But Russian media reacted just as quickly. Interestingly, they did not try to refute Tsahkna’s words or argue over whether the animated series contains propaganda. Instead, they turned his statement into a new propaganda story.
Netflix Became a Symbol of National Pride
The debate began after Netflix acquired the rights to the eighth and ninth seasons of the series and extended the licences for earlier seasons and spin-offs in more than a hundred countries.
Tsahkna responded to this on social media, writing:
“Russia wages war not only with missiles, but also with narratives. Masha and the Bear is part of the Kremlin’s soft power, weaving pro-Kremlin and militaristic messages into children’s entertainment while normalizing Russian aggression and imperial ambitions.”
In the same post, he added that the world would never accept a children’s program that portrayed National Socialist symbols in a positive light, and that Soviet symbols deserve the same moral judgement, since for many nations they represent occupation, mass murder, deportations, and crimes against humanity.
This position quickly gained international…ist tähelepanu, kuid Venemaa väljaanded hakkasid seda peaaegu kohe kasutama hoopis teistsuguse loo jutustamiseks.
“Estonia Saw Militarism in a Cartoon”
The first tactic was to make the entire debate look ridiculous.
Gazeta.ru’s headline stated bluntly: “Militaristic narratives noticed in the cartoon Masha and the Bear.”
The article summarizes Tsahkna’s post fairly accurately, but the whole emphasis is placed on the idea that the Estonian foreign minister supposedly “found” militarism in a children’s cartoon. No substantive discussion follows as to why such criticism emerged in the first place.
A similar technique is used by Rossiiskaya Gazeta, whose headline says that the Estonian foreign minister saw “imperial ambitions” in the animated series.
This wording shifts attention away from the question of propaganda and toward how supposedly absurd the accusation itself is.

Estonian Foreign Minister found militaristic narratives in the animated series Masha and the Bear.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna criticised the series in a post on X after the American company Netflix acquired the rights to two more seasons of Masha and the Bear, saying that it contained “militaristic narratives.”
Source: screenshot.

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna criticised Netflix’s decision, in a post on X, a platform blocked in Russia, to acquire the rights to show two new seasons of the Russian animated series Masha and the Bear and to extend the licences for earlier seasons and spin-offs.
“Masha and the Bear is part of the Kremlin’s soft power, weaving pro-Kremlin and militaristic ideas into children’s entertainment,” the Estonian minister stated. According to him, the animated series normalises “Russia’s imperial ambitions.”
Tsahkna also called for “moral clarity” in assessing Soviet symbols.
Source: screenshot.
Estonian foreign minister saw imperial ambitions in the animated series Masha and the Bear
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna criticised Netflix’s decision in a post on X, a platform blocked in Russia, to acquire the rights to show two new seasons of the Russian animated series Masha and the Bear and to extend licences for earlier seasons and spin-offs.
“Masha and the Bear is part of the Kremlin’s soft power, weaving pro-Kremlin and militaristic ideas into children’s entertainment,” the Estonian minister said. According to him, the animated series normalises “Russia’s imperial ambitions.”
Tsahkna also called for “moral clarity” when assessing Soviet symbols.

This is a classic propaganda technique. The reader is given the judgement already in the headline. Before they even get to read Tsahkna’s position, they have already been told how to react to it.
Propaganda Became a Story About Envy Instead
The most interesting shift, however, occurs in Gazeta.ru’s next article, where State Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov is given the floor. He barely talks about propaganda at all. Instead, he claims:
“These are words of hatred, because Estonian animators are incapable of creating anything even remotely comparable to Masha and the Bear.”
Milonov then develops the idea that because Estonia cannot produce quality animation of its own, it is simply trying to destroy a successful Russian cultural product. Finally, he calls Russian culture an instrument of Russia’s soft power, which “little rats” like the Estonian foreign minister are afraid of.

An important shift takes place here. The debate is no longer about whether the animated series contains propaganda. Instead, a new narrative is created: Estonia is attacking successful Russian culture simply out of envy.
This is a common propaganda technique. When the substance of the criticism is uncomfortable, the object of the debate is changed. Instead of responding to the accusation, the focus shifts to the critic’s motives.
“If Netflix Buys It, Then Everything Must Be Fine”
Almost all Russian outlets also emphasize another point. They repeatedly note that Netflix bought the rights for more than a hundred countries, that the series has tens of millions of YouTube subscribers, that it has been translated into dozens of languages, and that one episode has been included in the Guinness World Records.
These facts are correct. But their purpose is not merely to provide background. They also create an indirect conclusion: if the world’s largest streaming platform buys the series and billions of people watch it, then it cannot be propaganda.
Yet this argument does not answer Tsahkna’s criticism. International popularity says nothing in itself about whether a cultural product can also serve soft power goals. That is exactly what the Estonian foreign minister pointed out in his post.
The Same Event, Four Different Propaganda Frames
Russian media coverage shows clearly how a single international news story can be turned into several different propaganda narratives.
In one version, Estonia becomes a ridiculous country that looks for militarism in children’s cartoons. In another, the foreign minister is portrayed as an unbalanced politician. In a third, the story is no longer about propaganda at all, but about envy of Russian cultural success. In a fourth, Netflix’s decision is used as proof of Russia’s cultural influence.
None of these narratives is really interested in the substantive question of whether Masha and the Bear can function as a tool of Russian soft power. Instead, attention is redirected toward the critic himself and his motives. This kind of shift in focus is one of propaganda’s most characteristic techniques.
