We have repeatedly heard Russia claim that military intervention is the only way to protect its citizens abroad. This was stated in 2008 in Georgia and repeated in 2014 and 2022 in Ukraine. However, a logical question arises: how did Russian citizens end up in these sovereign countries in the first place?
Today, Propastop explains how the Kremlin employs the tactic of so-called “passportization”—distributing Russian passports in neighbouring countries to artificially create an ethnic minority. This process not only provides a pretext for invasion but also serves as justification for the subsequent occupation of these territories. On the recently occupied Ukrainian lands, this practice has also paved the way for repressions and tighter control over the local population.
South Ossetia: Passport as a Weapon for Justifying War
The distribution of passports to residents of neighboring countries is not a new phenomenon in the political arena. Armenia has done this in Nagorno-Karabakh, Hungary in Ukraine, and Turkey in Northern Cyprus. (More information about passport policies can be found in articles by Politico, Forbes, and a report by Yale University.) However, it is Russia that has turned this practice into a tool of hybrid warfare, using passports not just as documents, but as real catalysts for conflicts and a means to undermine the stability of its neighbours.
Russian passport policy began to take shape in 2002 with adoption of a new citizenship law. This law allowed anyone who had lived on the territory of the former Soviet republics until the collapse of the USSR and remained stateless to obtain a Russian passport through a simplified procedure. Although holders of grey passports in Estonia also used this right, the law primarily targeted the creation of “Russian citizens” in conflict zones — from Transnistria to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The most vivid examples of this approach are the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both territories declared their “independence” after the collapse of the USSR, while still being part of Georgia. Both regions became battlegrounds between the Georgian authorities and pro-Russian separatists.
Although these conflicts are now frozen, Russia still maintains leverage over Georgia thanks to the presence of “its citizens” there. Transforming residents into Russian nationals followed a familiar pattern that Moscow has used repeatedly: distributing passports, provoking conflict, and creating a dependent enclave. Even though the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been recognized by only five countries — Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru — the Kremlin continues to strengthen its influence.
For example, according to the 2015 census, Russians made up only 1% of the population of South Ossetia, and only 1.5% of residents considered Russian their native language. However, by 2008, on the eve of the war with Georgia, almost every resident already had a Russian passport. This was all due to the citizenship law, which allowed for a rapid conversion of the local population into Russian citizens — providing Moscow with a pretext for intervention.
Thus, Russia artificially created a “Russian national minority” or, in essence, its own citizen population on territory officially belonging to Georgia, which was then used as a pretext for military intervention. During the declaration of war, then-President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev stated: “According to the Constitution and other federal laws, as the President of the Russian Federation, I am obligated to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be. This is what guides my decisions at this moment.” (The full text of his speech is available on the Kremlin’s official website.)
The war under the pretext of “protecting Russian citizens” was Russia’s response to Georgia’s desire to move closer to the West. In the 1990s and 2000s, the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained “frozen” for Russia and were seen as localized wars on Georgian territory, while Moscow formally recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity. (Russia did not officially recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia until August 2008, although support for local separatists had been ongoing for years before that.)
After the so-called “Rose Revolution” and the rise of a new liberal administration in Georgia in 2003, Tbilisi’s move towards Western integration began to threaten the stability of South Ossetia, whose regime depended entirely on its ties with Russia. In this situation, maintaining the “frozen” conflict became a priority for Moscow, as it allowed it to preserve leverage over Georgian politics. Georgia’s pro-Western shift caused concern in the Kremlin and prompted it to intensify its activities in the region. Russia began to strengthen its presence and influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by actively distributing Russian passports to residents. In essence, mass passportization became Moscow’s response to Georgia’s foreign policy course, which no longer suited the Kremlin.
From the perspective of international law, South Ossetia is still considered part of Georgia, but de facto it is an independent republic over which Tbilisi has had no control since the deployment of Russian troops. The success of Russia’s passport policy in the region can be attributed to two factors. First, the local South Ossetian passport is not recognized by any country in the world, which means its holders cannot travel freely outside the region. The only solution is to use a Russian passport.
Formally, residents of South Ossetia can obtain Georgian citizenship as well, but after the bloody ethnic conflict, the vast majority of Ossetians categorically refuse to do so. For them, having a Russian passport is not only a way to travel outside the region and receive Russian social benefits, but also a symbol of political identity, emphasizing their independence from Tbilisi.
Interestingly, Moscow tried to implement a similar passport policy in Estonia in the early 2000s, but it failed. The reason is simple: holders of grey passports in Estonia had a much more attractive alternative — Estonian citizenship, which offered significantly more opportunities and rights.
Source: Donbass Realii, screenshot.
Ukraine: Passport as a Tool for the Persecution of Ukrainians
Passport policy remains an important tool for Russia even during the war in Ukraine, having been implemented immediately after the occupation of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. The new law automatically granted Russian citizenship to all residents of Crimea, and by the end of 2014, around 1.5 million people had obtained Russian passports. There was only a four-week window to reject this citizenship, forcing many people to choose between emigration and the unwilling acceptance of Russian citizenship.
This created a legal paradox: Russia considers even those who fled the occupation as “its citizens,” despite their refusal and the fact that many of them do not possess Russian passports. This situation became a reason for pressure on pro-Ukrainian activists: their social services were restricted, and they faced threats of dismissal or even arrest.
Those who refused Russian citizenship were subjected to persecution: they were denied access to medical care and social benefits, and some were fired from their jobs. In Donetsk and Luhansk, the policy followed a different path. Unlike Crimea, these territories were not formally integrated into Russia, so their so-called passports are not recognized anywhere except by Russia itself. Ukrainian documents became inconvenient and dangerous for local residents, while the “republican” ones became worthless, isolating people and restricting their rights and freedoms.
In reality, Russia began the simplified distribution of its passports in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk as early as 2019, as local authorities had already banned residents from holding Ukrainian citizenship at that time. With the start of the full-scale war in 2022, the Russian passport became a tool for persecuting the residents of occupied territories. The occupying authorities announced that those who refused Russian citizenship and kept their Ukrainian passports would face restrictions in employment, deprivation of social benefits and medical assistance, as well as a denial of humanitarian aid. For example, teachers in Mariupol who kept their Ukrainian passports were threatened with dismissal, and many job advertisements indicated that a Russian passport was mandatory.
Residents of territories liberated by the Ukrainian army have reported that Russian soldiers, during document checks, brutally beat some people who had not obtained Russian passports.
The passport policy can be viewed as part of Russia’s broader strategy to deny the existence of the Ukrainian state and its identity. One of the strongest links between an individual and a state is citizenship, as it implies the citizen’s acceptance of the culture, identity, and social order of their country. Although in the case of Ukraine, it is doubtful that the new Russian passport holders truly recognize the Russian socio-political system, the imposition of Russian passports demonstrates Moscow’s desire to sever the ties between residents of the occupied territories and Ukraine as a national and cultural entity.
The forced passportization allowed the occupying authorities to quickly identify potential regime opponents. Those who refused to obtain a Russian passport were highly likely to be seen as active opponents of the occupation, and thus automatically became targets for persecution. The authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk started establishing special detention centers for “foreign citizens” — meaning Ukrainians who refused to accept Russian passports.
At the same time, even those who agreed to take Russian citizenship did not become full-fledged citizens of the Russian Federation. Russian law allows the revocation of their citizenship for various offenses, such as “discrediting the armed forces” or “spreading false information.” This simplifies the establishment of censorship and suppression of dissent in the occupied territories.
Additionally, the Russian passport brings new obligations, primarily military conscription into the Russian army. Thus, residents of the occupied territories face an unbearable choice: obtain a Russian passport and risk being sent to the front lines, where they would have to fight against their own compatriots, or refuse it and face arrest and persecution. Although mobilization in the occupied territories of Ukraine violates the norms of the Geneva Convention, there are numerous documented cases of Ukrainians being forcibly sent to fight against their own people.
According to the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine and Minister for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, Iryna Vereshchuk, the forced distribution of Russian passports to residents of the occupied territories is essentially a war crime.
Illustration: Suspilne Novyny, screenshot.
Forced Citizenship: The Story of 70-Year-Old Valentina
на свободной тThe publication Suspilne Novyny – Суспільне Новини recently shared the story of Valentina, a pensioner from an occupied territory, who experienced firsthand the pressure due to her refusal to obtain a Russian passport. Valentina fell severely ill with COVID-19 in 2020, but at that time she was still admitted to the hospital despite not having either a Russian or a “DPR passport.”
The situation changed after the full-scale invasion began in 2022. When Valentina applied for her husband’s death certificate in the summer, she was immediately asked, “Do you have a Russian passport?” Nevertheless, they still issued the document based on her Ukrainian passport.
But by early last year, the pension fund gave her a clear ultimatum: “If you don’t take a Russian passport, you will lose access to all your bank savings, your pension payments will be stopped, and you will be deprived of social benefits. And most importantly — if you get sick, you won’t be admitted to the hospital, and you will die at home.”
Following the advice of her daughter, who lives in free Ukraine, Valentina had no choice but to give in and, after almost ten years of pressure, finally accepted a Russian passport. Meanwhile, other Ukrainian pensioners living in the occupied territories, who still resist and refuse to accept the occupiers’ citizenship, risk their health and lives — the Russian authorities completely deprive them of social benefits and access to medical services.
