At the end of January, a study by experts from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences was released, examining the potential impact of Russia’s developments on Estonia’s security. The study outlines four possible scenarios and their potential effects on our society’s safety. Propastop summarizes the key observations and conclusions of the study, focusing on the field of Kremlin information influence activities, whose main strategy can be divided into four mutually reinforcing objectives:
- Silencing of power criticism within Russia’s domestic audience and justification of the aggression war against Ukraine;
- Discrediting Ukraine’s defense actions and labeling them as a ‘puppet of the USA’;
- Undermining the unity of NATO and European Union member states in supporting Ukraine;
- Mobilizing the Global South against ‘Western hegemony and US colonialism.’
Strengthening control over the domestic audience
The ‘defense’ of the information environment, which includes strategic influence operations, is the official doctrine of the Russian Federation. The tools of this doctrine have been gradually legally cemented during Putin’s regime, with the necessary resources ensured. While over 1.5 billion USD was allocated to the media from the Russian state budget in 2021, the corresponding allocations in January–March 2022 had almost tripled compared to the same period of the previous year. The substantial increase in funding for controlled media indicates the Kremlin’s growing fear of dissatisfaction spreading among the population, necessitating even more intensive national propaganda.
The Russian federal media regulator and censor, Roskomnadzor (Роскомнадзор), established in 2008 to control the domestic audience, has, since September 2020, increased monitoring of online protests and anti-war sentiments using a specialized automated monitoring system. The system tracks media discourse that could conflict with official government positions, such as criticizing government officials, negative impacts of sanctions on the economy, ethnic-religious conflicts, and ‘incorrect’ interpretations of World War II. According to information from the opposition media platform Meduza referenced in the study, Roskomnadzor sends monitoring reports to local branches of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, regional administrations, and federal inspectors.
Strengthening the ‘foreign agents’ law
In recent years, the cultivation of opposition to Western countries has been increasingly promoted within Russia. Under the well-known ‘foreign agent‘ law, international organizations operating in Russia, as well as associations and groups that involve foreign funding, are classified as ‘foreign agents.’ The law, amended in 2022, broadens the definition of a foreign agent to the extent that authorities can label almost any organization or individual, regardless of nationality or location, showing civic activity or expressing critical opinions about Kremlin policies or the behavior of officials, as being under foreign influence. Such ‘foreign agents’ are prohibited from teaching, participating in child-rearing activities, or producing informational materials for minors. They are also restricted from organizing public meetings or supporting them with donations. Therefore, the Kremlin engages in intensive information warfare targeting both foreign and domestic audiences, including influencing the domestic politics of Western countries.
The Russian Orthodox Church as a tool of the Kremlin.
The study, citing various sources, highlights that the Russian Orthodox Church has been a longstanding tool of the Kremlin’s political influence both domestically and abroad, serving the Russki Mir ideology alongside its religious activities. After Patriarch Kirill became the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2009, the church’s growing presence in Russia’s state affairs extended to the military. By 2010, the church had expanded its influence in the armed forces through the deployment of military priests. In 2020, a special cathedral for the armed forces was inaugurated near Moscow, symbolizing the church’s significant role in Russia’s military history.
The 2022 invasion of Ukraine elevated the involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in supporting the aggression to a new level. Since the beginning of the war, social media in Russia has been flooded with images of religious icons, prayers for the victory of the Russian army, and calls to pray for soldiers on the battlefield. Patriarch Kirill has become a leading justifier and supporter of the Kremlin’s ‘military special operation.’ After President Putin announced partial mobilization in September 2022, Kirill declared that “sacrifices in war wash away all sins.” He also attacked the West, claiming that it hinders Ukraine from becoming a “sacred part of a united Russia.” With over 38,000 congregations outside Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church has a significantly broad geographic reach for spreading the patriarch’s messages.
According to the conclusions of the study, there is no basis to believe that the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church would change its course in supporting the aggression against Ukraine. On the contrary, in the event of increasing military losses for Russia, efforts may be made to further canonize the invasion and support recruitment into the army.
Intensification of hybrid activities
The study concludes that the established power vertical in Russia over decades continues to pose challenges to both immediate neighbors and other countries, whether maintaining the status quo or in scenarios of potential drastic change. The conclusions anticipate an intensification of Russia’s hybrid activities, including continued interference in the internal processes and elections of European Union and NATO member states. This interference aims to fragment Western unity and reduce or slow down their cooperation in supporting Ukraine. To counter this, the Kremlin employs a multifaceted and well-financed system of information manipulation, necessitating more effective information space defense and strategic communication cooperation among EU and NATO member states.
Given the multiplied resources allocated to state-controlled media, one can predict an intensification of Kremlin propaganda and information influence activities directed towards both domestic and foreign audiences, including attempts to polarize along ethnic lines. New areas and topics with the potential to create sharper divisions within NATO, the European Union, and Estonia are also exploited, whether related to migration, climate activities, or others. Additionally, efforts are made to divert the attention of Western countries from Ukraine by fragmenting their resources with various regional crises that the Putin regime seeks to fuel.
The screenshots are taken from the sources used in the article.
