Churchill Fellowship researcher Beth Lambert has recently published a study titled “Effective Cross-Society Combat Against Disinformation Campaigns” as a result of her extensive work. Lambert examined the best practices for combating disinformation in Estonia, Lithuania, and Taiwan by interviewing a total of fifty experts in these countries.
Propastop publishes Lambert’s description of the situation in Estonia because the thorough research provides an interesting, impartial assessment of Estonia’s achievements and readiness to combat foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
“Although the situation in the United Kingdom is different from that of Estonia (the size of the country, population, the national language, and the absence of conscription in the UK are all different), we share common threats,” writes Lambert in the introduction. “But since the Baltic States is often a testing ground where the Kremlin tests its narratives before spreading them in the information spaces of other countries, the United Kingdom can adopt valuable lessons from Estonia’s countermeasures in combating disinformation.”
Description of the threat landscape
According to Lambert, hostile states have focused their activities on social media platforms, highlighting the influence of Telegram in Estonia. “Since the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine, Estonia’s regulatory authority (the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority) has shut down 307 websites and blocked access to 53 TV channels under EU sanctions. One aim of these sanctions is to reduce the Kremlin’s constant ‘information laundering,’ but removing propagandist websites is like cutting off the heads of a hydra. Therefore, combining regulatory actions with strong civil society engagement is important,” Lambert notes.
She describes her meeting with a Propastop volunteer who joined the organization after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, fearing that “Estonia might be next.” According to her sources, the governments of Estonia and Lithuania are concerned about the narrative of the spread of Nazism in Donbas, which the Kremlin propagated for a long time before invading Ukraine. The Kremlin uses a similar narrative about the spread of Nazism and Russophobia in Lithuania and Estonia, raising the question, “Is Narva the next Donbas?”
Lambert explains to UK readers that the target audience of the Kremlin’s disinformation narratives in Estonia is primarily the Russian-speaking population who arrived during the Soviet occupation, making up 22.5% of the country’s population. In the border town of Narva, 95% of the inhabitants are Russian and can still watch Russian TV channels without restrictions.
This tactic is effective because the European Commission’s September 2023 report “Feeling Cornered: Analysis of the Russian-Speaking Minority in Estonia” highlighted that “there is still a group among the Russian-speaking population who are disturbingly susceptible to Russian propaganda and disinformation.”
Cross-Society Response
One project developing the resilience of this target group at the grassroots level is the British Council’s “People to People” program. This program has helped “communities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania become more socially cohesive and develop a stronger sense of democratic values.”
The program, funded by the UK government, started in 2016 with a pilot project budget of £500,000. Over eight years, the project’s budget has grown to £2 million annually (approximately €1.6 million).
The project’s main focus is on integrating the Russian-speaking population living in the northeastern part of the country, with 98,000 people having participated over the years. Activities funded by “People to People” create a common space for interaction between Estonian- and Russian-speaking residents.
“Although Estonia has achieved a strong international reputation as a ‘digital-first’ country, the British Council emphasizes the need to use libraries, cultural centres, and post offices as contact points to reach people in more remote areas,” writes Lambert. “If these are closed—as has happened in the UK, where funding for public service institutions has decreased—it could significantly hinder the ability to reach remote communities.”
Strategic Communication
For the past six years, the State Chancellery has been responsible for managing strategic communication across government agencies, and its countermeasures against disinformation are divided into three areas: education and media literacy, crisis communication, and situational awareness.
Media literacy is included in the national curriculum at both the elementary and high school levels. Journalism and fact-checking are supported by NGOs, universities, and embassies. To improve situational awareness, efforts are made to engage with both Estonian and Russian-language media and social media and to maintain Estonia’s reputation in Western countries, particularly NATO member states.
Civil Society
Lambert points out that Estonian experts in combating disinformation are closely connected through informal channels. The development of this network was strongly motivated by the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022.
“Although it is difficult to measure the size of this network, it was described as invaluable,” writes Lambert. “In Estonia, it is acknowledged that the country’s small size is like a double-edged sword, as the limited state budget makes it difficult to fund larger projects. However, civil society has leveraged the small population to create a flexible and highly efficient network, which has proposed several innovative projects.”
As examples, Lambert mentions:
- At the University of Tartu, Estonia’s first master’s program focused on disinformation, “Disinformation and Societal Resilience,” has started. Funded by the USA, it brings together students from Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, and Serbia.
- The blog Propastop, established nine years ago, aims to “cleanse Estonia of propaganda, misinformation, and media lies.” Their monitoring tool, the “Propamon” robot, constantly searches Russian media channels for news about Estonia and compiles daily threat assessments based on this information. A team of hundreds of volunteers supplements this tool by searching social media sites.
- Since 2022, Naiskodukaitse (Women’s voluntary defense organization) has integrated the development of cyber resilience into its activities using the “train the trainer” principle. Naiskodukaitse trains active female leaders in communities to ensure they are prepared to disseminate accurate and necessary information within their networks during crisis management and cyber incidents.
Practical Recommendations
Based on the experiences of Estonia, Lithuania, and Taiwan, Lambert presented a long list of recommendations for combating disinformation to the UK government, the technology sector, journalism, and civil society. Propastop conveys the recommendations given to civil society:
- Identify and develop trusted local leaders who can disseminate and amplify accurate information in crises. These community leaders can act as spokespersons to mitigate the impact of deliberately spreading misinformation.
- Prioritize innovative projects involving local civic associations that enhance societal resilience to the spread of misinformation and foreign information manipulation. Test the viability of ideas through pilot projects. It is especially important to direct projects involving civic associations towards target groups that are particularly vulnerable to hostile foreign disinformation campaigns.
Study and Researcher’s Background
Beth Lambert expressed her gratitude for the pleasant cooperation with Delfi Media, Propastop, the State Chancellery and its current and former strategic communication experts, the General Staff of the Defence Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British Council, and the University of Tartu.
Beth Lambert works at the UK technology company Logically, which helps combat disinformation using both AI and its experts. Lambert advises democratic governments, NGOs, and social media platforms in their fight against hostile influence operations.
The Churchill Fellowship was established in 1965 and supports British citizens’ research abroad to adopt successful experiences from other countries.
