Numerous. But how capable? What is the state of the Belarusian army in 2024?

Belarus’ President Lukashenko, known for his aggressive stance, recently threatened a “pre-emptive strike” against Lithuania. Amid rising tensions, Belarus is massing troops, tanks, and artillery near Ukraine’s northern border under the guise of exercises, with former Wagner troops also reported in the area. Lukashenko claims the buildup, involving a third of his army, stems from a “misunderstanding” with Ukraine. In light of this, Propastop offers an assessment of the real combat capabilities of the Belarusian army.

Global Firepower annually ranks each country’s military strength. The Global Firepower Index compares conventional warfare capabilities across land, sea, and air, using 50 different factors but excluding nuclear arsenals. As of 2024, Belarus ranks 64th among 145 countries, down from 52nd in 2022. Ukraine ranks 18th, an improvement from 22nd in 2022. Russia remains the second most powerful military in the world, following the USA. Estonia is ranked 87th.

At the same time, countries are gradually increasing their defense budgets due to the war in Ukraine. For example, in Estonia, this figure will exceed 3% of the gross domestic product for the first time in 2024, with over 1.3 billion euros invested in defense. Among the 31 member states of the Western military alliance, Poland (3.9%), the USA (3.49%), and Greece (3.01%) currently have the highest defence spending as a percentage of GDP. Germany will also increase its defense spending to 2% of GDP starting in 2024. Lithuania, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom have also surpassed the two percent threshold.

What equipment are the Belarusian forces equipped with?

Like many post-Soviet states, Belarus inherited significant military equipment from the USSR, including the powerful Belarusian Military District. The Belarusian armed forces comprise ground, air, and special operations forces, all overseen by the General Staff. Belarus maintains three airbases and has several air defense units equipped with S-200, S-300, BUK, Tor-MK, and Osa-AKM systems.

The Belarusian military primarily consists of outdated Soviet-era tanks and vehicles, with over 1,200 tanks theoretically deployable but many in reserve without crews. The military doctrine is strictly defensive, prohibiting offensive operations from its territory. Experts argue that the Belarusian army, particularly its air force and air defense, lacks significant offensive capabilities, reflecting its largely Soviet-style structure.

The only military units the Belarusian leadership can rely on are the special operations forces.

Special operations forces are the elite of the Belarusian army, but they too are based on Soviet airborne units and GRU special forces—the Vitebsk Airborne Brigade, the Brest Air Assault Brigade, and the separate special operations brigade in Maryina Gorka. In 2007, the special operations forces were separated from the ground forces and, since then have been a distinct unit with a personnel strength of 4000-6000. None of the units are reserve, meaning they also have full staff and combat readiness during peacetime. Belarusians have known these forces since 2020; they actively participated in suppressing mass protests after the presidential elections.

The weakness of the special operations brigades is that, according to experts, the light infantry elite unit itself is a tool designed for very specific tasks. The SDF is not assigned tanks, heavy artillery, or air defense systems, and they lack anything that would keep them capable of defense. For example, similar combat units in the Ukrainian army are equipped with modern tanks and air defense weapons: Javelin and NLAW anti-tank guided missiles, Carl Gustaf grenade launchers, and Stinger and Piorun MANPADS. Such armaments allow them to counter the well-equipped Russian army effectively. The Belarusian SDF does not have such capabilities; the “post-Soviet” armament of Belarusian paratroopers is practically nonexistent.

Currently, these are likely the only military units the Belarusian leadership can fully rely on, both for loyalty and the capability to fulfil assigned combat tasks.

How numerous is the Belarusian army? 

European countries are shifting towards smaller, professional armies. The Belarusian armed forces consist of approximately 65,000 personnel, a figure reported in 2016 that remains relevant assuming stable defense budgets. Excluding civilian staff and cadets, this includes 45,500 active soldiers and commanders.

Sergei Grabski, a former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense employee and military expert, reports that about 30% of the Belarusian army is combat-ready, amounting to around 20,000 troops. Since April 2022, Belarus has enhanced its combat training and readiness, indicating a formidable force that operates in coordination with the Russian military and is not to be underestimated.

Publicly available data suggests Belarus has around 145,000 reservists and 55,000 territorial soldiers. Despite a perceived lack of heavy equipment, Belarus reportedly possesses 300 operational tanks out of 517 tanks total, with 336 ready for combat as of 2024.

‘Ukraine understands based on economic calculations how much the Russian army uses Belarusian fuel from Belarusian refineries. Attacks on Ukrainian territory were carried out from Belarusian territory. Belarus, as a country, provided full support to the Russian army. Ukraine does not wish to attack Belarus. However, we monitor the rotation of military units at our border with Belarus, which are not engaged in border protection. We are observing the deployment of Russian air defense systems on Belarusian territory. Of course, these are manned by Belarusian personnel. The fact that there is currently no shooting from Belarusian territory does not mean that there are no Russian air defense systems on Belarusian territory.

Of course, these are manned by Belarusian personnel. The fact that there is currently no shooting from Belarusian territory does not mean that the Russian army’s Belarusian corps does not pose a threat to Ukrainian security,’ said the Ukrainian military expert.

The Belarusian army is training diligently, trying to adopt the experiences of the Russian army

Political analyst Artyom Shraibman notes that the Belarusian army is currently training diligently, trying to adopt the experiences of both, the Russian army and the Wagner group. ‘Additionally, there has been an increase in mobilization activities within the forces. I would say that Belarus has been preparing for a softer mobilization for the past year and a half, both legally and practically,’ says the expert. He also claims that Lukashenko himself is not interested in a new war and would resist forced actions, explaining to Putin why side-by-side involvement turns out problematic. However, the analyst believes that if Putin has the resources and a real desire to involve Belarus in war, Lukashenko will not be able to stop it.

Alexander Lukashenko stated in his recent speech that Belarus does not need, and will not need in the future, to join military actions. Lukashenko pointed out that such demands are sometimes made by ‘hurray-patriots,’ as they are called in the Russian media. ‘These calls to involve Belarus in the war in Ukraine – are to NATO’s benefit. They are the ones who want and do everything to drag us into the war with Ukraine,’ he emphasized. Lukashenko explained that in such a case, the front’s length would increase by thousands of kilometers at the expense of the Belarusian border with Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states: ‘You and I would have to close this front if we enter the war. Can we do it? We cannot. This is what I’m telling you: we cannot. Do we want to bring problems on ourselves? We don’t. That’s another thing. Firstly, perhaps Ukraine could use such a peaceful Belarus as Russia does today.”

War blogger Rainer Saks: Belarus supports the aggression but in a more restrained manner

This support includes allowing Russian forces to use Belarusian territory for the initial invasion in February 2022 and for missile launches into Ukraine. Additionally, Belarus has been a recruitment ground for the Russian army and a training location for its troops.

President Alexander Lukashenko claims that Belarusian forces are not participating in the conflict. However, his administration’s avoidance of direct involvement is likely due to the poor condition of Belarusian military equipment and training, as well as widespread public opposition in Belarus to the war against Ukraine.

Despite Lukashenko’s previous allowances for Russian military use of Belarusian territory, over the past year, he has refrained from permitting attacks launched from Belarus. During the period when Russian troops were active in Belarus, Ukrainian special forces conducted operations within Belarusian borders, and Belarusian units formed within the Ukrainian army were highlighted in the media for their engagements against Russian forces. Facing increasing risks, Lukashenko decided to halt the active presence of Russian military activities in Belarus.

Lukashenko has attempted to present himself as a potential mediator between Ukraine and Russia, but given that Belarusian policy is dominated by Russia, these efforts are unlikely to be successful.

The figures used are sourced from public data, analyses by think tanks, and reports from the Belarusian Ministry of Defense.