Behind the Narrative of a Russian Attack on the Baltic States

08.01.2024

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In the realm of information warfare, Russian propaganda has long been recognized for its sophisticated use of multiple sources to bolster its narratives. This approach was identified as early as 2016 in “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model.” Recent events have once again highlighted this tactic, particularly with the emergence of news about a planned attack on the Baltic States in 2024.

The narrative gained traction when Julian Röpcke, a contributor to Bild, published an article on December 24, 2023, provocatively titled “Is Putin planning the next attack soon?” The piece suggests the potential for an assault on a NATO, most likely Baltic, country around the winter of 2024/25, coinciding with the U.S. transition period. Notably, the article relies on an unnamed source expressing concerns about the timing. It’s crucial to note that Bild is a tabloid newspaper, and Röpcke has faced criticism in the past for reporting unverified or false information. In his article published on December 24, 2024, Röpcke talks about an alleged “secret plan” that would push Ukraine to start negotiations with Russia to end the full-scale war. These claims were refuted by the Federal Government of Germany and James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

Adding to the chorus of ominous predictions, Professor Solovey, a Russian political scientist and historian known for his penchant for conspiracy theories, joined the narrative. In a New Year interview with Yulia Latynina, Solovey predicted a highly successful hybrid attack on the Baltic States in autumn 2024. However, it’s worth highlighting that Solovey has a track record of incorrect predictions, including foreseeing a Russian attack on the Baltic States in 2019 and 2020. Since 2017, he has regularly predicted the imminent end of Putin’s regime in Russia.

On January 5, 2024, this narrative took an interesting turn with a call on Rogozin‘s Telegram channel. The message advocated for the creation of a corridor between Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast, enabling Russian citizens to travel visa-free to Kaliningrad and back. This call was a response to a message from another Russian propaganda channel, Sputnik News, which reported Lithuania’s decision to close Russian schools.

Who spreads this narrative in Estonia? 

On June 29th, 2023, Oleg Ivanov, a member of the Koos party currently residing in Russia, expressed his concerns about “potential provocations” from Tallinn. Ivanov suggested that the city of Narva is undergoing depopulation for the construction of a NATO base, strategically positioned just 100 kilometers from St. Petersburg. His warning includes the anticipation of military provocations from Estonia, drawing parallels with the situation that unfolded in Ukraine.

This narrative, propagated by Ivanov, aligns with the broader themes seen in Russian propaganda, where the specter of NATO expansion is often depicted as a potential threat to Russian interests. The emphasis on the proximity of the NATO base to St. Petersburg adds a geopolitical dimension to the narrative, playing on regional sensitivities.

Interestingly, Varro Vooglaid, another figure in the Estonian information landscape, echoed a similar narrative. Commenting on the Pskov drone attack on August 30, 2023, Vooglaid drew a swift parallel to the war in Ukraine, questioning how fast such conflicts could spread to Estonia if the drones were indeed sent from Estonian territory.

The motivations behind such efforts include:

Confusion and Panic: By disseminating narratives about potential provocations and military activities, these individuals aim to create confusion and panic within both domestic and Western audiences. This psychological impact can disrupt coherent understanding and sow seeds of uncertainty.

Reduction of Military Aid to Ukraine: The narratives may also intend to influence Western countries, particularly those providing military aid to Ukraine. By drawing attention to perceived threats in the Baltic region, the propagators might seek to divert military assistance away from Ukraine, reducing support for the ongoing conflict.

Diversion of Attention: Another strategic goal could be to divert international attention from ongoing issues or conflicts, such as the situation in Ukraine. By introducing narratives of potential provocations in the Baltic States, attention may be redirected, allowing for the manipulation of public focus.

Testing Reactions: The dissemination of such narratives may serve as a testing ground to gauge reactions, both domestically and internationally. By observing how audiences respond to these provocative messages, propagators can refine their tactics and tailor future narratives accordingly.

Targeting both domestic and Western audiences, propagators aim to instill fear and suspicion within Estonia and Russia, shaping public opinion and influencing political discourse. Simultaneously, the narratives seek to impact Western policymakers and the public in NATO member states, aiming to influence foreign policy decisions, diminish support for military aid to Ukraine, and generate skepticism about NATO activities in the Baltic region.

Perspectives from NATO Leaders and Western Academics

NATO is debating the pace of Russia’s military recovery post-Ukraine, with a German document proposing a 5 to 9-year period. However, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, relying on a report from the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA), asserts a shorter timeframe of 3 to 5 years. Emphasizing Western unity and its stance on Ukraine, Kallas notes Russia’s desire for a pause to strengthen itself, emphasizing that weakness provokes aggression. According to Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA), Moscow’s post-Ukraine focus is swiftly reinforcing forces in western Russia, maintaining the ability to exert military pressure in the Baltic region.

Fabian Hoffmann (Doctoral Research Fellow from the University of Oslo) suggests a narrow window of 2 to 3 years to restore deterrence against Russia’s strategic approach. Prioritizing coercion over prolonged ground warfare, Russia signals its capacity for escalating damage through long-range strikes on vital civilian infrastructure in European NATO countries. The primary objective is to dissuade NATO support for Eastern European allies by showcasing potential suffering. Russia aims to establish a nuclear umbrella over captured NATO territory, acting as a deterrent against reclamation, especially by external NATO forces. This strategy relies on instilling psychological fear, pushing for negotiations on Russia’s terms, and framing the envisioned war scenario as a risk-taking competition challenging NATO’s resolve.

 

The narrative of Russia’s attack on NATO serves as a tool for Russian agents of influence to instill fear and gather opinions. Meanwhile, NATO representatives and Western academics are focused on calculating the potential restoration time for Russia’s military abilities. Amidst these dynamics, the ongoing conflict and its possible outcomes remain pivotal, with Ukraine’s victory over Russia holding crucial implications for European security.

The used images are screenshots from the referenced pages.