On July 3, Propastop published an article examining Russia’s negative image on Chinese social media. We do not intend to cover the positive narratives separately here. Those interested can explore them in greater detail in the report The Yin and Yang of Russia’s Image in China: Netizen Discourse and Real-Life Implications. This article instead focuses on the narratives that lie between these two poles: neither overtly negative nor unconditionally positive. These pragmatic narratives support Russia’s actions only when doing so aligns with China’s own interests and strategic objectives. The article concludes with a more theoretical discussion that helps explain why these pragmatic narratives are the ones that most accurately reflect Beijing’s actual position.
Russia as a Necessary Partner in the Struggle Against the United States and Western Civilization
Against the backdrop of growing geopolitical tensions, it is not difficult to understand why some Chinese see Putin’s “crusade” against Western civilization as a noble cause. Support for partnership with Russia draws on both historical and contemporary parallels. Commentators often invoke earlier periods of Sino-Russian cooperation, particularly China’s close relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, creating the impression that cooperation with Moscow is both natural and historically familiar.
At times, Chinese social media even features claims that Russia’s actions are altruistic and directly serve China’s interests, even at the cost of Russia’s own decline.
Such assessments, however, are the exception rather than the rule. More commonly, Russia is seen as a geopolitical partner whose objectives simply happen to align with China’s. It is portrayed as a political force that undermines Washington’s influence, thereby shielding China and helping Beijing shape a more favorable international order. Nothing more.
As one commenter put it:
“Russia’s actions have shattered the Americans’ dreams! From now on, the world will change. The decline of the United States and the West will only accelerate.”
Unlike the positive narratives, which depict Russia as an irreversibly triumphant great power, these pragmatic narratives do not value Russia or the Russian people for any supposedly admirable qualities. Instead, Russia is viewed primarily through the lens of its usefulness in advancing China’s strategic interests.
This perspective is often coldly calculating, if not outright cynical: Russia is viewed as a means to achieve objectives that matter to Beijing. The historical tensions with Russia discussed in the previous article have by no means been forgotten. Rather, they have been temporarily set aside in favor of present-day strategic considerations.
Russia as an economic partner
That Russia is a useful economic partner for China is also well known. Siberia’s forests and mineral resources are seen as essential to China’s development. As one commentator puts it: “China and Russia must remain firm friends in order to build a stronger and more prosperous homeland and give their people a better life.” Since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, trade between Russia and China has increased significantly.
Yet this narrative, too, is primarily pragmatic. Posts and comments often reveal a sense of superiority towards China’s northern neighbour: Russia is portrayed as the weaker, smaller brother that cannot be relied on forever. Historical resentment continues to smoulder beneath the surface and can be overlooked only as long as Russia remains economically useful to China. Economic cooperation with Russia is also often seen as necessary for improving people’s own material well-being.
This brings two important cultural norms into conflict: patriotism and historical justice on the one hand, and economic development and personal prosperity on the other. Patriotism rooted in historical memory can therefore clash with the natural desire to improve one’s standard of living, forcing people to choose, among other things, whether Russia should be regarded as a friend or an enemy. Some argue that China should do business with Moscow and maintain economic cooperation even if historical mistrust persists. Others disagree. This debate illustrates that Russia remains a contested subject within Chinese society.
The logic of “United Front work”
The contradiction described above can be explained through the logic of “United Front work”. According to this logic, China can cooperate with Russia for as long as the main adversary, the United States, has not yet been defeated. Once that conflict is no longer acute, old territorial and historical disputes may resurface, and the former partner can become the new enemy.
The logic of “United Front work” draws on historical parallels. During the Second World War, the Chinese Communists cooperated with the government of the Republic of China in order to resist the attack of Imperial Japan, only to turn against each other again afterwards. The famous novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, published in Estonian in 1959, can also help make sense of complex geopolitical realities. The novel describes the period of civil war in China between 220 and 280, when the country was divided into three major kingdoms. Two of them joined forces to defeat the stronger one, but then turned against each other.
Such historical analogies are used to explain why a temporary alliance with Russia may be sensible even when there is no deep trust in Moscow. Beijing’s strategists often draw on the historical analogies described in the novel when weighing which conflicts are worth pursuing and which are better postponed. The lesson drawn from all these historical examples is the same: for now, it makes sense to keep historical grievances against Russia under wraps. Russia is compared to an ally alongside whom China simply has to wait for the right moment, after which historical justice can be restored. This is why comments often argue that, for the time being, China must remain “in the same trench” with the Russians and put old grievances aside.
Pragmatic narratives, however, do not call for historical resentment to be forgiven. Many Chinese internet users do not regard Russia as a permanent ally, but rather as a temporary comrade-in-arms.
When assessing the logic of “United Front work”, however, it is important to bear in mind that nationalist propaganda and interpretations of history shape both public opinion and the thinking of party leaders, whose decisions are influenced not only by rational geopolitical calculations but also by emotions, nationalism and historical grievances. In other words, the logic of “United Front work” may not always be the dominant factor shaping China–Russia relations. Although Beijing’s strategic interests favour cooperation with Moscow, nationalist sentiment could significantly strain the relationship in the future. China–Russia relations therefore need to be assessed in light of both geopolitical calculations and the influence of national historical narratives and emotions.
Overall, it can be argued that for many Chinese internet users, Russia is primarily a geopolitical and economic instrument rather than a dearly loved ally. Cooperation with Moscow is seen as useful, but temporary. Once again, the conclusion is that the two countries are bound not by shared values but by shared interests. If the larger confrontation with the West is ever resolved, historical grievances and territorial claims against Russia are likely to resurface. Pragmatic narratives therefore portray the relationship between China and Russia primarily as…
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The article is based on the University of Tartu Asia Centre report “Chinese Netizens’ Perceptions of the Sino-Russian Border” and the International Centre for Defence and Security report “The Yin and Yang of Russia’s Image in China: Netizen Discourse and Real-Life Implications.”
