Just a few years ago, Russian propaganda was mainly associated with TV channels, troll factories, and aggressive talking points. Today, the picture is far more complex. Influence operations no longer happen only through the media, but increasingly through institutions, communities, and digital infrastructure. The goal is no longer simply to persuade, but to build long-term networks, collect information, shape identities, and keep influence structures functioning both inside Russia and beyond its borders.
Developments revealed over recent weeks show quite clearly how these different layers connect. On one hand, Moscow is rapidly increasing funding for foreign propaganda at a record pace. On the other, it is expanding its work with “compatriots” living abroad, while simultaneously developing a digital system aimed at young people that is designed to monitor attitudes and shape values. Viewed separately, these may look like isolated projects. Together, they form different parts of a coherent influence infrastructure.
Record-breaking propaganda funding
Supporters and sympathizers of Russia gather at Piazza San Giovanni to mark the “Immortal Regiment” event on the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany on May 7, 2023. (Source: Getty Images)
In mid-May, UNITED24 Media reported that Russia allocated a record $1.85 billion in its 2026 federal budget for foreign propaganda activities. According to Ukrainian foreign intelligence estimates, this represents a 54% increase compared to the previous year.
The money is not flowing only into traditional media. According to the same report, the funds are also being used to support Russian Houses, loyal foreign organizations, new information platforms, and mirror media outlets. Following European Union sanctions, Russian influence networks have increasingly begun creating new publications that avoid direct Kremlin symbolism and instead use softer rhetoric.
It is important to pay attention to the type of messaging spread through these channels. The article describes how “peace messaging” is being used to soften Russia’s image while portraying Ukraine as the party preventing the war from ending. At the same time, narratives about European “war fatigue” and Russia’s supposedly inevitable global influence continue to be repeated.
This is no longer the classic propaganda model where a single television channel broadcasts a single narrative. Influence now spreads simultaneously through culture, media, community initiatives, “peace movements,” and organizational networks. Propaganda no longer remains confined to one channel, but diffuses across different layers of society.
“Compatriots” as a geopolitical network
The most important part of this system may not actually be the media, but diaspora policy.
In an interview with TASS, Gennady Ovechko, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s department for compatriots abroad, stated that Moscow is aggressively expanding its support for “compatriots” living overseas. According to him, Russia will not abandon its communities “in difficult times” and is strengthening both legal assistance and the coordination of diaspora structures.
According to department head Gennady Ovechko, more than 17,500 free consultations were provided in 2025.
The interview offers a fairly revealing glimpse into just how extensive this system actually is. Through a foundation created by the Russian Foreign Ministry and Rossotrudnichestvo, 53 legal assistance centers are operating across 30 countries, and in 2025 alone they provided more than 17,500 free consultations.
Even more noteworthy, however, is the way Russia itself describes these communities. According to Ovechko, activists living in “unfriendly countries” are facing pressure from “Russophobic authorities,” and Moscow’s goal is to protect them. This language is not neutral diaspora outreach. It reflects a framework in which Russian-speaking communities abroad are viewed as a geopolitical sphere of influence.
Insight News described the same system in even greater detail. According to its analysis, Rossotrudnichestvo now operates in 71 countries, while Russia estimates the number of “compatriots” living abroad at between 20 and 40 million people. Officially, the focus is framed as preserving Russian language and culture, but European security agencies have repeatedly warned that such structures are also used for influence operations and the creation of intelligence networks.
At the same time, Russia is developing a digital service platform called “Rodina” (“Motherland”), aimed at “compatriots” living abroad. The project description openly states that the service is designed to facilitate relocation to Russia and centralizes information about jobs, housing, education, healthcare, and state services. Through the platform, users can also apply for an electronic signature, allowing them to access Russian digital services online. The first service centers have already opened in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
The “Rodina” project clearly illustrates how diaspora policy is evolving from cultural ties toward administrative and digital integration. Within this framework, Russian-speaking communities living abroad are treated not merely as a cultural connection, but as a geopolitical sphere of influence through which loyalty can be maintained and attitudes shaped beyond Russia’s borders.
Shaping youth through digital infrastructure
Russian boys from a pioneer organization use smartphones on June 1, 2022, in Gorki Leninskiye near Moscow, Russia. (Source: Getty Images)
The same logic is now spreading inside Russia as well.
In May, UNITED24 Media reported that Russia’s Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, Rosmolodyozh (Росмолодёжь), is developing a chatbot and digital support system designed to monitor young people’s behavioral patterns, analyze their problems, and steer users toward “traditional spiritual and moral values.”
According to the official description, the system will integrate various communication channels, including VKontakte, email, hotlines, and Max Messenger. It will process user inquiries, collect thematic trends, and create “personalized support” mechanisms for difficult life situations.
The most important detail, however, lies in the stated objective. The documents explicitly say that the system is intended to help involve young people in political and social activities while strengthening “traditional Russian values.” The platform combines data collection, behavioral analysis, values-based communication, and state ideology into a single integrated system.
Where earlier propaganda focused mainly on spreading messages, the new approach seeks to shape an environment in which the connection between the individual, the community, and the state remains constantly active.
Influence operations are becoming less visible
Taken together, these developments reveal an important shift. Russia is no longer building only propaganda channels, but a comprehensive influence infrastructure. Within this system, youth programs, diaspora organizations, cultural centers, “legal assistance,” digital services, and the protection of “traditional values” all play a role. Viewed separately, these may appear to be ordinary social initiatives. The problem emerges when they are simultaneously used to expand geopolitical influence and maintain networks of loyalty.
Where propaganda was once associated mainly with television channels and posters, influence is now increasingly moving through communities, organizations, and digital platforms. It is no longer spread only through messages, but built through long-term relationships, services, and institutional networks that continue functioning even when a specific campaign or narrative changes.
That is precisely why modern influence operations are harder to recognize than before. They no longer appear only as propaganda, but increasingly as ordinary community initiatives, cultural activities, or digital solutions.
