Compared to March, April was a calmer month, but Estonia remained strongly associated in international media with the security of NATO’s eastern flank, Russia’s hybrid activities, and tensions between the United States and its European allies. While in March attention focused on Ukrainian drones entering Estonian airspace, in April the narratives surrounding those incidents had already begun to take on a life of their own.
The drones did not disappear anywhere
Although April no longer saw attention on the scale of the March “Auvere incident,” stories about Ukrainian drones and the possible role of the Baltic states in the context of those attacks continued to circulate. German and British outlets kept publishing speculation that Russia may have deliberately redirected drones toward the Baltic states. At the same time, Western media also amplified threats made by Sergei Shoigu and Maria Zakharova, who claimed that the Baltic states had created a “green corridor” for Ukraine to attack Russia.
- Delfi: “Has Ukraine effectively taken over Estonia’s entire airspace to attack Russia? No, this is a Russian information operation.”
- Re:Baltica: “How Russian propaganda created the story that the Baltic states had ‘opened the skies’ to Ukrainian drones”
The purpose of such claims is not only to accuse Ukraine or NATO. Gradually, they create the impression that the Baltic states are no longer just bystanders, but part of the conflict itself. When the same claim is repeated across different channels for long enough, it starts functioning as a standalone explanation even after it has been debunked.
The “Narva People’s Republic” became an international story
In April, coverage of the “Narva People’s Republic” narrative also continued, although compared to earlier reporting, the tone was somewhat more analytical. One of the more balanced examples was a detailed report by BFM TV, which emphasized that the campaign was linked to Russian propaganda and lacked meaningful local support. According to experts, the goal was to test the West’s reaction, polarize society, and undermine trust in the state.
At the same time, especially in the French media, stories appeared that blended the drone incidents, the “Narva People’s Republic,” and NATO’s possible weakness into a single escalation scenario. Most notably, a report by Le Monde portrayed Estonia essentially as a potential weak link in NATO under Russian pressure.
- Le Monde: Narva as NATO’s possible weak link under Russian pressure
- BFM TV: “When Russia tests Europe and NATO: how the ‘Narva People’s Republic,’ Estonia’s fictional separatist ‘state,’ and Russian online propaganda became a real deception.”
Estonia as both dangerous and abandoned
One particularly contradictory pattern became visible in the April information space: several different narratives about Estonia were built up in parallel. In one version, Estonia was portrayed as an aggressive, anti-Russian state helping Ukraine attack Russia and seeking to escalate the conflict. In another, Estonia was described as a small, abandoned country that NATO allies might leave behind in a crisis. These two narratives do not cancel each other out. Instead, they work together and amplify a broader sense of insecurity.
A similar pattern could also be seen in the coverage of interviews given by Alar Karis. His comments about restoring relations and communicating with Russia in the future were gradually reframed in Russian media as a sign that even Estonia was beginning to recognize the failure of the West’s previous Russia policy. Later clarifications were not treated as separate statements, but as part of the same narrative — as if the president had been forced to “walk back” his earlier remarks.
- Estonia as both dangerous and abandoned: how contradictory narratives are constructed in Russian media
- How the president’s clarification was ground into an “apology” in the propaganda mill
Influence operations are not limited to individual false claims
The stories circulating in April showed clearly that influence operations are not just about isolated falsehoods or propaganda pieces. Alongside them operate slower and deeper channels of influence that shape perceptions over a much longer period of time.
For example, there was discussion about Chinese influence activities in Estonian schools and the broader question of how authoritarian states use culture, education, and identity to expand their influence.
- ERR: “The Chinese embassy is actively brainwashing children in Estonian schools”
- ECFR: “Chinamaxxing: Beijing’s new source of soft power”
At the same time, attention was also given to the role of artificial intelligence in spreading disinformation. Several stories described how AI-generated content is making the production of false information faster, cheaper, and harder to detect.
- Reuters: “AI deepfakes blur reality in the 2026 U.S. midterm election campaigns”
- NewsGuard: “Mistral’s Le Chat repeats state-backed disinformation related to the Iran war in half of tested cases”
- DFRLab : “Early evidence of state-linked propaganda in AI training data”
Conclusion
April once again demonstrated that influence operations do not work through isolated false claims alone, but through linking together different themes and events. Drone incidents, the “Narva People’s Republic” narrative, questions about NATO’s credibility, and statements by Estonian politicians were woven into a broader story portraying the Baltic states as both threatened and threatening at the same time.
In narratives like these, what matters is not only what happened. More important is how events are connected to one another and what kind of meaning is ultimately attached to them.
