“An analysis published on 9 March by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) describes how the People’s Republic of China has in recent years developed a considerably more subtle and harder-to-detect influence strategy directed at Europe.
While Russia’s information operations are often direct and visible, China’s approach relies on more covert mechanisms whose aim is to make messages credible precisely because they do not appear to originate from outside.
According to ECFR’s assessment, China’s strength lies not only in the messages themselves, but in the ways in which they are disseminated.”
Influence Without a Visible Source
The report describes several recurring techniques through which Chinese messages reach the European information environment.
‘Borrowed mouths’
Chinese messages are often spread by local opinion leaders, such as journalists, academics, or influencers. Because the message does not come directly from a Chinese state institution but through a local individual, it comes across as more credible.
Sponsored collaboration is frequently used for this purpose: paid posts, covered trips, or other benefits whose aim is to shape a more positive image of China. This is not incidental cooperation but a deliberate strategy in which the credibility of messages is built through their apparent ‘local’ origin.
Information laundering
Narratives created in Chinese state media do not necessarily reach European audiences directly. Instead, they travel through various channels, such as smaller media outlets, blogs, or third-party platforms. Each step reduces the visibility of the original source.
The result is content that appears to be part of local media or analysis, even though its roots extend back to Chinese state communication structures.
Message concealment (cloaking)
This technique differs from information laundering in that content does not travel through multiple intermediaries; instead, its true origin is concealed from the outset.
Content produced by Chinese state media may appear in the European information environment in a form that gives the impression of an independent or local source. For example, articles or videos may be produced by Chinese state structures but presented in a way that does not indicate their true origin.
This approach makes influence operations particularly difficult to detect, as the audience has no means of assessing the actual origin and interests behind the source.
‘Bait-and-switch’
Some accounts initially build a following with neutral content, such as travel or cultural topics. Once an audience has formed and trust has been established, the same channels gradually begin sharing political messages as well.
This approach makes it possible to reach people who would not consciously seek out or consume political propaganda.
Amplification of existing messages
China does not always create new narratives but frequently exploits existing debates.
According to ECFR, Chinese channels actively amplify the views of European politicians, activists, and opinion leaders when these align with Chinese interests. For example, criticism of NATO, the European Union, or the United States may gain greater international reach through Chinese media channels.
In this way, China does not need to create the message itself — it is sufficient to highlight existing opinions and increase their international resonance.”
What Stories Are Being Spread?
According to the report, China does not spread random messages in Europe but rather recurring and clearly distinguishable narratives.
China as a stable and successful great power — Chinese state communication portrays the country as economically successful, technologically advanced, and politically stable. The aim is to present China as a functioning alternative to the Western democratic model.
The political and economic decline of the West — A second recurring narrative focuses on the problems of Europe and the United States. Political polarisation, economic difficulties, and social tensions are emphasised in order to create the impression of a weakening Western system.
Reframing Russian aggression — The Chinese media space circulates a narrative according to which the war in Ukraine is not solely Russia’s responsibility, but in which NATO expansion played a role in its genesis.
It is important to note that these messages do not spread randomly but recur consistently across different channels and formats.
Why Does This Work?
The distinctive feature of China’s influence operations lies in the fact that they do not appear to be influence operations.
Messages reach audiences through local intermediaries, in familiar channels, and often without a clear reference to the original source. They do not stand out as propaganda from outside but blend in as a natural part of public debate.
According to ECFR’s assessment, it is precisely this that makes China’s approach effective over the long term. When a message does not feel like propaganda, it is also harder to call into question.
The ECFR analysis shows that China is not seeking to dominate Europe through loud and direct communication, but rather to influence debates from within, exploiting trust, local voices, and existing societal tensions. It is precisely this that makes such influence operations difficult to detect and even harder to counter.
