Screenshot: Bild.
September 2025 turned out to be one of the most intense media months in Estonia’s history—both in terms of coverage volume and international attention—according to a media analysis compiled by the Government Office. The primary reason was the airspace violation on 19 September by three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets and the subsequent actions taken: the invocation of NATO Article 4 consultations and the convening of the UN Security Council. Contributing to the heightened attention was also the outstanding work of Estonian politicians, diplomats, and officials, which ensured the incident remained a top international news story for several days.
“It can be said that Estonia and its spokespersons have never been under such intense global media scrutiny: from 19 to 30 September, nearly 170,000 reports mentioning Estonia were published worldwide, accounting for almost 10% of all Estonia-related media coverage this year,” the Government Office noted in its summary of media monitoring.
Virtually all major international agencies and outlets covered the incident, many of them with dozens of articles. The event was portrayed as an unprecedented provocation against NATO, underscored by strong statements from Estonia and its allies. Previous provocations by Moscow—particularly the presence of drones in Polish airspace—also played a role in shaping the narrative.
The discussions held at NATO and UN levels, along with strong statements of support from allies, reinforced Estonia’s narrative and shaped the international discourse. Estonia’s top political leaders and diplomatic representatives were highly visible—their positions and comments were featured by dozens of international outlets, from Reuters and Bloomberg to CNN and the BBC. Estonia’s narrative dominated the information space, with the phrase “unprecedentedly brazen” being particularly well received by the media.matult jultunud.
Estonia was linked to Trump and drone attacks
Significant attention was also drawn by U.S. President Donald Trump’s comment suggesting that Russian aircraft violating NATO airspace should be shot down. (“Yes I do,” Trump replied to journalists when asked whether NATO countries should shoot down Russian planes entering the alliance’s airspace.)
The aftermath of the incident continued in the following days. Alongside the MiG incident, a series of new topics emerged: drone incidents in Denmark and Sweden, airstrikes in Ukraine, parliamentary elections in Moldova, and discussions about establishing a “drone wall.” The Estonian case became linked to these developments, ensuring its continued presence in the international media spotlight.
This pattern was reinforced by repeated statements of support from allies and by Russia’s failed attempts to accuse Estonia of lying or to issue threats of escalation if NATO were to begin shooting down Russian aircraft.
Screenshot: Foreign Policy.
Among the topics covered in September, particular attention was given to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace and the “Zapad 2025” military exercise—both of which fueled the “Baltics are next” narrative. This narrative once again highlighted the vulnerability of the Suwalki Corridor and the potential isolation of the Baltic states in a crisis situation. While some experts—such as Edward Lucas in Foreign Policy—sought to counterbalance the over-dramatization, several outlets amplified Kremlin narratives, portraying the exercises as significantly larger in scale than they actually were.
Adding to this wave of fear-driven narratives were stories about Narva and Hiiumaa as possible “weak links.” For instance, the German newspaper Bild ran a story titled “On Putin’s border: Estonian frontier city prepares,” with an introductory line stating: “The Estonian city of Narva lies just a river’s width from Russia—no other EU city is closer. And it’s precisely here that fear is growing.”
At the beginning of September, another key topic captured the attention of international media—the U.S. administration’s plan to cut European security assistance programs, including the Baltic Security Initiative, which has supported the Baltic states. Although the final decision rests with Congress, the media widely covered the Baltic states’ concerns and the growing need to increase defense spending. In this debate, Estonia positioned itself firmly as an ally ready to contribute more and to support Ukraine’s security.
This broader context also included discussions in Paris on security guarantees for Ukraine, where Estonia reaffirmed its readiness to deploy peacekeeping forces if necessary. At the same time, Estonia’s image as a digital state was reinforced—debates launched in the United Kingdom over the adoption of ID cards highlighted Estonia as a positive example, although past security risks were also noted.
One of the more bizarre stories of the month came from the British tabloid Daily Star, with the headline: “Estonia preps for Putin’s WW3 as bunkers, trenches and giant medieval castle built.” The article claimed that Estonia is reinforcing its eastern border with extensive defense structures, including 200 miles of trenches, nearly 600 bunkers, and the construction of a symbolic medieval castle to prepare for possible Russian aggression. The project, with a reported cost of £60 million, was justified by lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, while Moscow’s propaganda described the move as Estonia “digging its own grave.” The article was illustrated with a photo of Ivangorod Fortress, captioned: “A castle (not this one) is being built.”
There was also a sharp increase in the flow of disinformation from the Kremlin
In September, the flow of disinformation from the East increased sharply—66% higher than the previous month and 47% above the yearly average. As in Western media, the violation of Estonian airspace was the number one topic for Kremlin propagandists. Moscow denied any breach of airspace and instead accused Estonia and Western countries of lying, Russophobia, and provoking war. The usual pattern of behavior was also employed—releasing various contradictory fragments of information into the public sphere to create confusion and distrust among audiences.
The Kremlin dismissed claims that Russian pilots had allegedly entered foreign airspace as hysterical outbursts without evidence. “Once again, we are hearing this excessive hysteria over the idea that our military pilots supposedly broke some rules and entered someone’s airspace,” said Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for the Russian president.
Septembris kasvas idast pärinev desinformatsioonivoog järsult – 66% võrra võrreldes eelneva kuuga ja 47% üle aasta keskmise. Nagu ka lääne meedias, oli Eesti õhuruumi rikkumine Kremli propagandistide jaoks peamine teema. Moskva eitas igasugust õhupiiri rikkumist ning süüdistas hoopis Eestit ja lääneriike valetamises, russofoobias ja sõja provotseerimises. Kasutati tavapärast käitumismustrit – avalikkuse ette paisati erinevaid vastukäivaid infokilde, et tekitada segadust ja usaldamatust.
Kremlis nimetati väiteid, et Vene piloodid olevat väidetavalt tunginud kellegi õhuruumi, tõenditeta hüsteeriapuhanguteks. „Jälle kuuleme sellist ülevoolavat hüsteeriat selle üle, et meie sõjaväelendurid justkui rikkusid mingeid reegleid ja tungisid kellegi õhuruumi,“ ütles Venemaa presidendi pressiesindaja Dmitri Peskov.
Kremlin propaganda also personally mocked Estonian politicians: former president Dmitry Medvedev ridiculed Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur’s visit to Kyiv, claiming that “the smaller the country, the more arrogant and foolish its leaders are.” Maria Zakharova called Kaja Kallas “critically illiterate” in response to a statement by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that Russia is technologically weak.
In fact, Estonians’ sense of security increased in September.
Despite provocations by the Russian Air Force, Estonians’ sense of security did not decrease in September—in fact, it slightly increased. This was revealed by a public opinion monitoring survey conducted by Turu-uuringute AS on behalf of the Government Office between 17–21 September, with responses from 1,265 people.
In September, 43% of residents considered the state of the country to be secure (up from 40% in June). In daily life, 65% of residents felt safe in Estonia (compared to 59% in June). Among residents of other nationalities, the sense of security rose significantly—from 54% to 62%. The general level of anxiety among the population remained stable: 33% of respondents reported feeling anxious often or very often, a figure similar to that of a year ago.
