“The diaspora decides – have you already made your choice?” – with this message the government encouraged pro-Western citizens living in Europe to take part in the elections.
According to preliminary reports, pro-European citizens won yesterday’s parliamentary elections in Moldova, even though the Kremlin spent over 100 million dollars trying to bring this poor small country back under its influence by combining various hybrid warfare tools: financing and merging anti-EU parties into electoral blocs, once again organizing a large network-marketing scheme for vote buying, flooding Moldova’s information space with disinformation campaigns, attempting to use electoral fraud, and preparing to stage street unrest in case of an unfavorable election outcome.
Vote buying: Oligarch Ilan Shor, who fled from Moldova to Moscow, built a large-scale vote-buying network similar to the one used during last autumn’s presidential elections and the Euro-referendum. Last year, Shor’s network managed to pay around 130,000 people between 60 and 100 dollars for a pro-Kremlin decision.
Since Moldovan authorities blocked the network’s previous funding channels, this time Shor tried to finance vote buying with a specially created “crypto-ruble.” However, police once again seized large amounts of cash this year, primarily to fund a network operating on social media.
The Patriotic Bloc, which came in second in the elections, included communists, socialists, and several populist parties created by the Kremlin.
Pro-Kremlin electoral blocs: Through Shor, the Kremlin financed the Patriotic Bloc, which came in second in the elections, as well as several other opposition parties. The leaders of these parties traveled to Russia multiple times this year, where they were received at a high level and encouraged to cooperate against the ruling party PAS.
The aim was to create a situation where Moldovans, frustrated with their poor living conditions, would vote against the government and, in the absence of a real alternative, cast their ballots against pro-European policies—whether by supporting the communists and socialists, the electoral bloc Alternative led by Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban who presents himself as pro-European, or the party of populist Renato Usatîi.
Disinformation: The Kremlin carried out extensive and multilayered disinformation operations, using AI-generated videos and memes, as well as clips with fake authorship. Social media was flooded with anti-government and pro-Russian narratives spread by bot networks operating through TikTok, YouTube, Telegram, and X accounts, with the aim of undermining trust in President Maia Sandu and the ruling party PAS.
Since many Moldovan citizens live in Romania, they were informed about Putin’s influence operations through outdoor advertising like this: Putin controls the exiled oligarchs Shor and Plahotniuc, who in turn control their puppets in Moldova.
Election fraud: Attempts were also made to influence the election results through more “old-fashioned” tricks. For example, Moldovan police discovered 200 illegal ballots in a printing house and uncovered evidence suggesting the organization of a “carousel voting” scheme.
In Romania, cases were found where thousands of people were registered at a single address (many individuals hold both Moldovan and Romanian citizenship, which allows them to participate in both countries’ elections). In all these instances, the violations were linked to pro-Kremlin parties.
Immediately after the polling stations closed, the government had to warn against a video clip going viral on social media that appeared to show ballots cast against the ruling party being burned.
Street unrest: According to Moldovan authorities, dozens of people were taken to Serbia, where Russian military instructors (including GRU officer Andrei Pavlov, who was identified by name) trained them to organize mass protests in case the election results were unfavorable to the Kremlin. In connection with this case, Moldovan police carried out 250 searches and detained 74 people.
Opposition leader and head of the Patriotic Bloc Igor Dodon yesterday, immediately after the polling stations closed, called on his supporters to gather in downtown Chișinău at noon today to celebrate victory. However, due to the election defeat, this event can be turned into a protest against the “rigged” election results.
Of course, the above list is not exhaustive. For example, on election day there were also cyberattacks and bomb threats targeting polling stations mainly located in Europe, aimed at preventing Moldova’s pro-European diaspora from voting.
Who directed the hybrid warfare attacks?
The hybrid war against Moldova was directed by Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of President Putin’s administration. The GRU and Russian bot networks (such as Matryoshka) took part, along with exiled oligarchs Ilan Shor and Vladimir Plahotniuc, and local criminals who organized election fraud and managed Shor’s network. The Moldovan Orthodox Church was also involved in the campaign, with hundreds of its clergy traveling to Russia for “training” and receiving financial compensation for influencing their congregations.
What narratives did the Kremlin spread?
1. The ruling party is corrupt and breaks the law: President Maia Sandu and the ruling party PAS were portrayed as abusers of power who control the courts, the police, and the central election commission. Example: bot networks spread supposed “leaks” of documents that were meant to prove systematic election fraud.
2. The European Union brings poverty and loss of sovereignty: this narrative portrayed EU accession as a process in which Brussels imposes conditions harmful to Moldova’s economy and culture. Example: in talk shows on pro-Russian TV channels, price increases were linked to the “consequences of Eurointegration.”
3. Russia is Moldova’s natural protector: Moscow was presented as an ally that stabilizes the country, offers cheaper gas, and defends “traditional values” from the West. Example: pro-Russian politicians repeated Kremlin talking points in public speeches, and social media amplified Soviet nostalgia.
4. The West threatens Moldova’s security, and Romania is trying to swallow the country: voters were frightened with claims that cooperation with Western states would drag Moldova into war, while Romania was portrayed as wanting to absorb its small neighbor. Example: AI-generated videos, massively shared by bot networks on TikTok and Telegram, falsely attributed such statements to NATO and Romanian officials and politicians.
5. The government will rig the election results anyway: the central election commission was depicted as a government puppet whose task is to guarantee the ruling party’s victory. Example: fake photos of ballots already marked for the ruling party were circulated on Telegram.
What was the impact of these narratives?
All these narratives exploited the concerns and dissatisfaction of Moldova’s population—economic hardships, fear of war, and the division of society into pro-Western and pro-Eastern camps. The Kremlin took advantage of these natural worries by amplifying them through disinformation campaigns, which undermined trust in the Moldovan state and the European Union, and swayed hesitant voters to support pro-Kremlin parties.
The Moldovan authorities were prepared for the fight.
“It is admirable how the Moldovan state managed to withstand such a massive attack,” says Tiina Ilsen, head of PractNet, who has advised the Moldovan government on strategic communication in recent years. “This time, the Moldovan authorities were well prepared for Moscow’s forceful interference.”
As a result, the police and the prosecutor’s office were able to curb the activities of the network led by Ilan Shor, which was engaged in vote buying and amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives on social media.
“The Moldovan court also intervened decisively when several party leaders illegally used funding sources originating from Russia, removing them from the elections,” Ilsen points out. “Most importantly, in a situation where Moscow’s hybrid war polarized society, a clear majority of Moldovans demonstrated their will to move forward toward the West, not back to the East.”
The screenshots used as illustrations come from social media platforms.
