“Old Wine” is a series in which Propastop explores the similarities between modern Russian propaganda and Soviet-era influence operations. In today’s article, Propastop describes one of the theoretical foundations of Russian propaganda — the theory of reflexive control developed during the Soviet era.
Mis on refleksiivne kontroll?
The theory of reflexive control was developed by mathematical psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre (1936–2020) while he was still working for the Soviet Army, before emigrating to the United States.
The logic of reflexive control is simple: it involves distorting the information environment so that, based on this distorted environment, the target (even the enemy) makes decisions that are harmful to themselves. The target of reflexive control is a person’s so-called information filter — the mechanism by which we decide which pieces of information to trust and which to discard, and which information we use when making decisions.
Reflexive control mirrors the opponent’s decision-making processes, allowing the initiator of reflexive control to understand how a particular individual perceives the surrounding world, how this perception influences their actions, and where the weaknesses in the target’s decision-making process lie.
If person A always responds to information B with action C based on their personal information filter, then the only thing the initiator of reflexive control needs to do is ensure that information B reaches person A’s information filter. To person A, it seems as though they are making decisions independently, but this is merely an illusion — both the information leading to the decision and the decision itself have been selected by the initiator of reflexive control.
Reflexive control was only one part of a broader Soviet strategy launched in the 1950s, aimed at covert influence operations in Western countries. This strategy focused on destabilizing the Western world through the use of what are now familiar to many as “active measures.”
Three types of influence agents
These operations were carried out by three types of influence agents: so-called full-time agents, who undermined government institutions from within, spread propaganda, and engaged in sabotage — for example, the famous Cambridge Five, which included Kim Philby.
Locals recruited from the host countries, who spread harmful narratives within their own societies in exchange for payment. And finally, the “useful idiots,” who did not even realize that their information environment was completely controlled by the enemy.
The influence agents, in turn, sought to affect three factors that, to varying degrees, allow the initiator of reflexive control to distort the information environment: first, kinetic factors (activities related to specific military capabilities); second, information factors (activities related to the information environment); and third, psychological factors (activities aimed at influencing the target’s mindset).
Russia was not the only one to use reflexive control. According to Russian analysts, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) launched by President Reagan, along with his aggressive anti-Soviet rhetoric, was one of the best examples of reflexive control, as it forced the Soviet Union to spend vast amounts of money trying to develop a similar program.
Source: Wikipedia
At first glance, propaganda and reflexive control may seem very similar, as both involve activities within the information environment. However, reflexive control is more of a theoretical and analytical foundation for propaganda and other influence operations, helping to unify them into a single strategy and thus make them more effective. If propaganda is the “what,” then reflexive control is the “how.”
Reflexive Control in the Case of Georgia, 2008
Reflexive control as a tool of the Russian propaganda machine entered Western public awareness around 2014, when the Western world began to take Russia’s hybrid activities against Ukraine seriously. Today, almost no analysis of Russian information warfare fails to mention reflexive control.
As described in previous articles of the “Old Wine” series, the Soviet Union once devised certain methods, and Russia has since taken them to a new level.
Russia’s increased reliance on reflexive control likely stems from economic constraints. Russia cannot spend money at the same pace as the Western world, as the Russian economy is dozens of times smaller than that of Europe. As a result, the Russian war machine leans heavily on propaganda and manipulation of the information environment. Reflexive control is particularly effective in the information overload created by the digital world.
According to experts, the war in Georgia was a good example of how Russia used reflexive control to justify the conflict. The first step was a long-term influence campaign aimed at discrediting then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Through a fairly effective fake news campaign, Saakashvili was portrayed as an egotistical, childish, and hot-headed politician — a use of reflexive control’s information factors.
As a result of the campaign, Georgia’s internal political situation evolved in such a way that Saakashvili, whose main election promise had been to reintegrate the separatist regions that had broken away from Georgia, had little room for political maneuvering. The Georgian parliament passed several resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Meanwhile, the Georgian opposition constantly attacked Saakashvili for not reacting strongly enough to these resolutions — a reflection of the psychological factors at play.
Alongside preparing the political landscape, Russia also engaged in sending kinetic signals by supplying its “peacekeeping forces” in South Ossetia with ammunition and weapons — an example of using kinetic factors. They also launched the large-scale military exercise Kavkaz-2008, which concentrated over 10,000 Russian soldiers near South Ossetia.
The final step of reflexive control was the increase in attacks by South Ossetian separatists (the first explosion, considered the opening move of the war, occurred on August 1, injuring several Georgians, although the war officially started a week later), as well as the buildup of Russian military equipment along the Russia–South Ossetia border in the first days of August.
Following these developments, President Saakashvili preemptively moved Georgian forces toward the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. For Russia, this was sufficient to launch narratives about protecting civilians against “aggressive Georgians,” and a well-prepared Russia proceeded to successfully attack Georgia.
Instead of targeting national leaders, entire populations are targeted today
The case of Georgia, according to analysts, illustrates a situation where reflexive control was used against a country’s top leaders. Initially, national leaders were the primary targets of reflexive control, as it was easier to understand the information filters of individual people, and, in the view of the Soviet Union and Russia, influencing this group offered the greatest strategic advantage.
However, Cold War-era and even early 21st-century technology simply did not allow for the creation of an accurate psychological profile for larger target groups — such as an entire country’s population or a large segment of it — which reflexive control relies on.
Today, every social media platform collects vast amounts of personal data about its users. It is known precisely what we like, what motivates us to buy certain products, and — most importantly — what our information filters look like. This knowledge makes it possible to use reflexive control effectively on much larger target groups.
Russia’s Modern 4D Strategy
The most direct way to use reflexive control to manipulate larger target groups is through the use of influence agents. These can be influencers with large followings or thousands of fake accounts managed by troll farms and bots. Influence agents are used to distort narratives circulating in the information environment and to create confusion.
Western analysts refer to Russia’s current reflexive control strategy, which relies on influence agents, as the “4D strategy”:
- Dismiss (i.e., deny facts and your true intentions): For a long time, Putin publicly denied that Russian soldiers occupied Crimea in February 2014.
- Distort (i.e., distort the target group’s information space by confusing them with disinformation): A good example is the infamous story on Channel One, where an actress hired for a provocation falsely claimed that Ukrainian ultranationalists had crucified a three-year-old boy in Sloviansk in July 2014.
- Distract (i.e., divert attention elsewhere by inventing new facts that make the target group doubt their decisions): To shift blame, Russia proposed increasingly absurd theories about the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.
- Dismay (i.e., escalate the situation to intimidate the target group into submission): For example, in March 2015, Russia’s former ambassador to Denmark threatened that nuclear weapons would be aimed at Denmark if it dared to join NATO’s missile defense system.
One of the offices of the infamous troll factory, the Internet Research Agency, in St. Petersburg.
Source: Wikipedia
It is clear that the goal of such a strategy is to distort the information environment in a way that confuses larger target groups through the abundance and contradiction of narratives. Although it is often obvious that the source is Russian propaganda, there are always people in the West who believe these narratives and thus become vulnerable to manipulation through reflexive control.
If these people form, for example, a voter group that could tip the balance in an election, Russia can influence certain societal processes in foreign countries to its own advantage — without those people ever realizing they have been used.
The American think tank Institute for the Study of War has developed a model of Russia’s image-building strategy, which consists of four parts:
- The foundation of Kremlin power — kinetic and political pressure mechanisms (nuclear arsenal, energy supplies to Europe, veto power in the UN Security Council);
- Prejudices about Russia in Western countries (fear of provoking a nuclear power, misunderstandings about Russia’s foreign policy goals, and the resulting overestimation or underestimation of the Russian threat);
- Propaganda amplifiers (troll factories and the media);
- Time — since political power does not change hands in Russia, the Kremlin can simply wait until a more pro-Kremlin politician comes to power in a particular Western country.
Russia’s image in Western countries (Russia as a great power, Russia’s supposed right to its own sphere of influence, and the idea that opposing Russia is counterproductive). Reflexive control ties all these four elements together and supports the image of Russia as a superpower. It is precisely this image that pushes target groups to make decisions beneficial to Russia, out of fear that fighting against Russia would be hopeless.
How to Resist Reflexive Control?
According to researchers who study reflexive control, there are three steps to countering it:
Reflexive control relies on the initiator having a very good understanding of the target’s information filters, technical and military capabilities, desires, prejudices, and so on. Building such an overview takes a long time to reach the level where reflexive control becomes possible. If we make it harder for Russia to understand Western decision-making processes, it reduces the effectiveness of reflexive control, although achieving this is not easy in societies that value transparency.
Reflexive control depends on the ability to predict the target’s actions and decisions. Acting in unexpected ways can deter the enemy.
Reflexive control becomes ineffective once it is exposed. A single piece of disinformation is not fatal to our information environment. However, Russia’s characteristic tactic of saturating the information space undermines our information filters and makes them more vulnerable. Our information filters can be protected through effective strategic communication by debunking false narratives, engaging vulnerable target groups in the media sphere, and continuing education on hybrid warfare. Therefore, each instance of exposed propaganda helps build immunity against reflexive control.
It is also certainly possible to use reflexive control against Russia itself. This is precisely why Russia carefully keeps its real decision-making processes secret, conceals its people’s and society’s information filters and preferences, and increasingly locks down its own information space.
Previous stories published in the “Old Wine” series include: Old Wine in a New Bottle: Kremlin Interference in U.S. Elections; Old Wine in a New Bottle 2: Russia’s Biolabs Narrative; and Old Wine in a New Bottle 3: Narratives Undermining Ukraine in the Soviet Union.
