Western think tanks and intelligence agencies underestimated Ukraine’s resilience as much as Vladimir Putin, argue Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien in a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, as The Baltic Sentinel highlights. Meanwhile, Russia’s retreat from Syria and the fall of its ally, the Assad regime, underscore the Kremlin’s faltering global influence amid its struggles in Ukraine.
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Western experts widely predicted a swift Ukrainian defeat, with Kyiv expected to fall within 72 hours. Instead, by March, Russian forces retreated, humiliated by Ukraine’s unexpectedly fierce resistance.
These events exposed a major failure in Western analysis, which overestimated Russia’s military power and underestimated Ukraine’s resilience. In their report, The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure, Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien examine the roots of this misjudgment and offer lessons to prevent future strategic blunders.
Over- and Underestimations
Western analysts fixated on the belief that Russia’s military had undergone a transformative overhaul since its 2008 failures in Georgia. Increased defense spending and reforms under then-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov fueled the perception of a modern, unstoppable force. Foreign Policy predicted a “devastating” strike on Ukraine, and The Economist praised Russia’s rapid deployment capabilities, painting Kyiv’s fall as inevitable.
Ukraine, by contrast, was dismissed as underfunded and reliant on outdated Soviet-era equipment. Analysts expected its military to crumble within days. However, Ukraine defied these grim forecasts with a fierce defense, using Javelin missiles, Bayraktar drones, and S-300 systems to devastate Russian forces. Within weeks, Russia’s troops retreated from Kyiv, exposed by logistical failures and low morale.
How did experts misjudge so badly?
OVERESTIMATED RUSSIAN LOGISTICS. Cohen and O’Brien argue that Western analysts relied too heavily on quantitative metrics—tanks, troops, and aircraft—while overlooking critical qualitative factors like logistics and morale. Predictions, such as a RAND Corporation war game projecting Russia’s swift victory, assumed sheer numbers and advanced technology would dominate.
However, when the invasion began, Russia’s weaknesses became glaring. Poor logistics left tanks abandoned on Kyiv’s roads, while poorly coordinated battalion tactical groups struggled with basic tasks like supply and support. Analysts mistakenly viewed Russia’s military as a modernized, NATO-like force, ignoring corruption and systemic inefficiencies that hollowed it out.
UNDERESTIMATED RUSSIAN CORRUPTION. Western analysts largely ignored the corrosive impact of corruption on the Russian military, portraying it as a modernized force despite clear evidence of systemic theft and inefficiency. While reports occasionally mentioned issues like the 2,800 corruption charges filed against military officials in 2020, these warnings were dismissed in favor of praising Russia’s supposed progress since its 2008 failures in Georgia.
In reality, corruption left the military hollow. Sophisticated tanks and artillery often malfunctioned due to poor maintenance, and troops lacked basic supplies like food and uniforms. Logistical breakdowns and outdated equipment, such as aging T-72s and T-80s, revealed the stark gap between Western assumptions and battlefield realities. Russia’s military modernization was, in many ways, a facade.
The West’s failure to accurately predict Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was heavily influenced by groupthink—experts were reinforcing each other’s assumptions without questioning underlying beliefs. A small circle of think tanks, including the Center for Naval Analyses and RUSI, dominated the narrative, creating a feedback loop emphasising Russia’s strength and Ukraine’s inevitable defeat.
Dissenting voices were largely ignored. Days before the invasion, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency predicted Kyiv would fall within 72 hours, a projection later criticized for failing to consider Ukraine’s ability to resist. This echo chamber of uniform thinking sidelined alternative perspectives, exemplifying the dangers of groupthink in strategic analysis.
OVERESTIMATED RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY. Western analysts made a critical error by assuming Russia’s military operated like NATO, projecting Western standards of professionalism and effectiveness onto its forces. They believed Russian leadership was as competent and flexible as NATO’s and that troops were comparably trained and motivated.
In reality, Russia relied on poorly trained conscripts with low morale and discipline, compounded by a rigid command structure. This stark contrast was evident in the disorganized Russian retreat from Kyiv, exposing the flawed assumption of Western-style efficiency and leading to repeated misjudgments about the conflict.
UNDERESTIMATED UKRAINIANS. The analytic failures had significant real-world consequences. Doubts about Ukraine’s ability to withstand a Russian assault led Western governments to hesitate in supplying advanced weaponry like HIMARS, Stinger missiles, and Javelin anti-tank systems. These delays, rooted in the belief Kyiv would fall quickly, deprived Ukraine of critical tools for its defense.
Even after the invasion, fears of escalation or equipment capture slowed the delivery of heavy weapons, such as Leopard 2 tanks and long-range artillery, from countries like Germany and France. This hesitancy prolonged the conflict, giving Russia time to regroup and adapt.
Lessons to be learned
To prevent future analytical failures, Western intelligence must shift focus from quantitative metrics, like counting tanks and troops, to qualitative factors such as morale, leadership, and organizational culture. Ukraine’s national unity and determination showed how these human elements can defy numerical predictions.
Corruption and logistics are equally critical. As seen in Russia, corruption hollowed out its military, while poor logistics undermined battlefield performance. Future assessments must give these factors more weight.
Avoiding groupthink is essential. Intelligence agencies must welcome dissenting views and learn from diverse sources, including military officers with direct experience in regions of conflict. Analysts must also recognize that not all militaries function like NATO—understanding adversaries’ cultural and structural differences is key.
The misjudgments in the Russia-Ukraine war had dire consequences. By embracing humility, challenging assumptions, and deeply studying adversaries on their terms, analysts can better prepare for future challenges. The cost of repeating these mistakes is too high.
